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Abstract
We consider large double auctions with private values. Values need
be neither symmetric nor independent. Multiple units may be owned or
desired. Participation may be stochastic. We introduce a very mild notion
of “a little independence.” We prove that all non-trivial equilibria which
satisfy this notion are asymptotically e¢cient. For any ® > 0; ine¢ciency
disappears at rate 1=n
2¡®.
1 Introduction
Many market settings are approximated by a double auction. Standard exam-
ples are the London gold market, and the order books maintained by NYSE
specialists. These auctions typically have many traders on each side of the
market.
More importantly, large double auctions are in some sense the “right” model
for micro-foundations of price formation in competitive markets. Like a com-
petitive market, a large double auction has many traders. However, unlike the
standard competitive model, traders are strategic. Hence, if traders asymptoti-
cally ignore their e¤ect on price this is a result, not an assumption. And, there
is an explicit mechanism translating individual behaviors into prices. So, one of
the thorniest problems of the standard Walrasian model ¡ how does the market
get to equilibrium if everyone is a price taker ¡ is explicitly addressed. Finally,
double auctions are a better setting for thinking about price formation than
one-sided auctions, both because they are often a better match to reality, and
especially because they capture the essential problems of trade better than a
one-sided auction. A large one sided auction allows one to ask if traded units
end up in the right hands. But, it does not address whether the correct number
of units trade in the …rst place.
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1In aseminal paper, Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams (1994, henceforth
RSW) consider a double auction in which n buyers and sellers draw private
values iid. They show that symmetric, increasing, di¤erentiable equilibria in
this setting are in the limit e¢cient and that convergence is fast, of order 1=n2.
This is especially attractive in light of experimental evidence on e¢ciency in
double auctions with only a moderate number of players.1
Fudenberg, Mobius and Seidel (2003) extend the convergence result (without
a rate) to a setting in which a one dimensional state is sampled and values are
then drawn iid from a density that depends on the state, but has non-shifting
support and uniform lower bound across states.2 They also show existence of a
pure increasing symmetric equilibrium when the number of players is large.
These results are useful in thinking about how auctions approximate compet-
itive equilibria. However, there are several dimensions along which they could
be strengthened.
1. The proof technique depends heavily on symmetric distributions of values.
2. Even in the symmetric setting, there is no guarantee of uniqueness. So,
while well behaved symmetric equilibria are asymptotically e¢cient, there
may be other (possibly asymmetric) equilibria as well. In particular, there
is always the no-trade equilibrium in which allbuyers make an o¤er of zero,
and all sellers make an o¤er higher than any possible valuation. Results
before this paper do not rule out other intermediate trade equilibria.
3. While one may be willing to rule out the asymmetric equilibria on a priori
grounds in the symmetric case, selecting the “good” equilibria is much
harder if the initial setting is itself asymmetric.
4. Imposing symmetry on values and bids assumes away half the problem.
Objects that trade automatically move from and to the right people, and
so the only question is whether the volume of trade is right. Without
symmetry, it may also occur that, for example, a low valued buyer wins
an object when a higher valued buyer does not.
5. Finally, these papers consider only single unit demands and supplies.
We present a model and results addressing all these points. We consider a
generalized private value double auction setting.3 Players can be highly asym-
1Satterthwaite and Williams (2002) establish that in the iid setting, this rate is fastest
among all mechanisms. Important precursors to RSW include Chatterjee and Samuelson
(1983), Wilson (1985), Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989), and Satterthwaite and Williams,
(1989).
2Our model will encompass this case. See Example 4 below.
3A beautiful paper by Perry and Reny (2003) extends the previous work on information ag-
gregation in large one sided common value auctions (Wilson 1977, Milgrom 1979, Pesendorfer
and Swinkels 1997, etc.) to the double auction setting. A symmetric single unit demand and
supply setting is maintained. Using a discrete bid space to get existence, they show that in a
one dimensional a¢liated setting, the equilibrium price converges to the rational expectations
equilibrium value. So, Perry and Reny generalizes RSW in the direction of non-private values
while retaining most of other restrictions, while we generalize RSW in most other directions,
while, critically, retaining private values.
2metric, and demand or supply multiple units. Beyond the assumption of private
values, there are only three assumptions with any bite. First, while individual
values need be neither full support or even non-degenerate, we require that
any given interval in the support of values is eventually hit in expectation by
many players. We term this condition no asymptotic gaps (NAG). Analogously,
we will require there to be no asymptotic atoms (NAA): it cannot be the case
that a positive limiting fraction of players are expected to pile up in the same
arbitrarily small interval.
Most critically, we drastically relax independence. We require only that a
“little” independence across players persists as the number of players grows. A
sequence of distributions over player values satis…es z-independence, z 2 (0;1]
if the probability of any given event on player i’s values changes by factor
bounded between z and 1=z when one conditions on the values of the remaining
players, where z holds uniformly in the number of players. 1¡independence
is the standard notion of independence, while two perfectly correlated random
variables do not satisfy z-independence for any z > 0:
An interpretation of z-independence is that each player has at least a small
idiosyncratic component to his valuation, one that cannot be precisely predicted
no matter how much one knows about the values of other players. As such, this
is a fairly weak condition, admitting very broad classes of distributions.
Because values can be highly correlated (positively, negatively or otherwise)
under z-independence, even in the limit the allocation and price setting problem
will generally be non-trivial.
There is always a no-trade equilibrium in a double auction setting. Jackson
and Swinkels (2001, henceforth JS) show that there is at least one non-trivial
equilibrium as well. Our major result is simply stated:
As the number of players grows, every non-trivial equilibrium of the
double auction setting converges to the Walrasian outcome. Ine¢-
ciency disappears at rate 1=n2¡® for any ® > 0:
Asymptotic e¢ciency implies asymptotic uniqueness and pureness: over rel-
evant ranges, bids must be arbitrarily close to value. Thus, as n grows large,
there are precisely two types of equilibria of private value double auctions:
1. equilibria involving no trade
2. equilibria in which a near e¢cient level of trade occurs, at a price near the
competitive one.
With single unit demands and supplies, our proof works because in each
outcome of a double auction, there is at most one buyer who is both currently
winning an object and who would have raised the price had he bid more (the
lowest winning buyer). So, while many buyers might have raised price by bid-
ding more, only one would care that he did so. This is symmetric for sellers
considering lowering their bids. So, the expected relevant impact on price from
increased bids by buyers is already order 1=n: And, with lots of bidders, even
3if an increase in bid increases price, it should do so by an amount related to
1=n; since this should be the expected distance to the next bid. But then, since
the expected impact on price is order 1=n2, it must be that bidding honestly
almost never wins an extra object, and so those objects that are traded must
be allocated very e¢ciently.
The focus then turns to showing that the right number of objects trade,
or, equivalently, that the competitive gap de…ning the range of market clearing
prices grows small. This turns out to be much the hardest part of the paper
(especially with a rate). In the symmetric case, one can appeal to the …rst
order conditions of players near a discontinuity in bids. Here, things are much
more di¢cult, as without symmetric increasing strategies, (a) the very concept
of a “gap” becomes more complicated (b) it is hard to identify which player
types might bid near a gap, and (c) players can have very di¤erent beliefs about
the likelihoods of the events involved. We show that the only way to have a
signi…cant competitive gap without violating the e¢ciency already shown for
those objects traded is for the market to essentially become deterministic, with
a given set of buyers and sellers always trading. But then, any member of either
of these groups can favorably in‡uence the price without losing the chance to
trade.
The e¢ciency result generalizes to multiple unit demands as long as NAG
continues to hold for the …rst unit of demand and supply for each player. If
this holds, we can reformulate the arguments just outlined applied only to the
highest bid by each buyer and lowest bid by each seller to show small price
impacts of honest bidding. From there to (fast) e¢ciency for all units involves
a careful tracking of incentives, but is otherwise straightforward.
We begin by setting up the basic single unit demand and supply model.
We then introduce z-independence. Analysis of e¢ciency for the large double
auction with single unit demands and supplies follows. Then, we generalize
to auctions with multiple unit demands and supplies. We conclude with some
thoughts on extensions. All proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2 The Model
We begin with the structure of a given double auction A. A set …nite set N of
players is divided into subsets NS and NB: Players in NS are potential sellers,
each with one unit to sell. Players in NB are potential buyers, each desiring a
single unit.
Each i 2 N has valuation vi. For sellers, this might be either a production
cost or a value in use. For i 2 NB, we assume vi 2 [0;1): For i 2 NS; we assume
vi 2 (0;1]: A buyer with value 0 or a seller with value of 1 will never trade.
Because of this, there is no loss of generality in assuming an equal number of
buyers and sellers. Let n ´ jNsj = jNBj: Because one can “park” extra buyers
at 0 and extra sellers at 1, the model also allows a stochastic number of buyers
and sellers. The vector v ´ fvigi2N is drawn according to a probability measure
P on [0;1)n £ (0;1]n. The marginal of P onto vi is Pi.
4Each player i observes his value and then submits a bid bi 2 [0;1]. Trade
is determined by crossing the demand and supply curves constructed from the
submitted buy and sell bids.4 Call the (random) range of possible market clear-
ing prices the competitive gap, cg ´ [cg;cg]. If we let b(i) denote the ith highest
bid, then a little time with the appropriate …gure shows that cg = [bn+1;bn].
Assumption 1 Trade takes place at price
p = ^ p(cg;cg)
where ^ p is di¤erentiable, takes values in [cg;cg]; and has derivatives bounded by
0 and 1.5
Imagine that the bidder who submitted cg raises his bid substantially. As
long as his bid continues to de…ne cg, he raises the price at rate at most 1. As
soon as he passes the next bid up, he ceases to a¤ect price. Let ug = bn¡1
be this next bid, and de…ne the upper supporting gap as ug ´ [cg;sg]: Then,
the maximum e¤ect on the price is jugj: Similarly, let lg ´ bn+1; and de…ne
the lower supporting gap as lg ´ [lg;cg]. So, cg determines the amount of
choice there is in setting a market price, while lg and ug determine how closely
“supported” this range is.
Each player i has a vNM utility function ui: No particular structure on risk
preferences is required, but we do require each ui to be increasing and have
slope bounded from 0 and 1.6
2.1 Equilibrium
A set of distributional strategies f¹igi2N (Milgrom and Weber, 1982) is an
equilibrium if it is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which buyers never bid above
vi, and sellers never bid below vi. The equilibrium is non-trivial if there is a
positive probability of trade.
We show that non-trivial equilibria are asymptotically e¢cient. This, of
course, is a better result if such equilibria exist! Under slightly stronger condi-
tions than we use here, JS show that this is indeed the case.7
2.2 Sequences of Auctions
Consider a sequence of such auctions fAng; where n tends to in…nity. We need
three conditions that apply across n: First, while individual values need not
have full support (and may, in fact, be atomic), we require that as n grows
large, each subinterval is hit with non-vanishing probability.
4If tied buy and sell bids allow more than one level of trade, the largest is chosen.
5This of course includes the standard k double auction.
6In the proofs, we assume risk neutrality. Dealing with vNM utility functions with slope
bounded from 0 and 1 involves scaling potential gains down by some factor from the risk
neutral case, and potential loses up. This merely introduces notation.
7The two key assumptions are mutual absolute continuity of P with respect to ¦iPi; and
atomless Pi: Neither assumption plays any further role in the development here.
5Assumption 2 (No Asymptotic Gaps) There is w > 0 such that for all n, and
for all intervals I µ (0;1) of length 1=n or greater,
X
i2NB




Note that P;NB;NS etc. all vary from one An to another. We suppress this
in our notation as convenient.
Our second assumption is similar:
Assumption 3 (No Asymptotic Atoms) There is W < 1 such that for all n,
and for all intervals I µ (0;1) of length 1=n or greater,
X
i2NB




That is, not too many values fall in any given interval. These conditions
hold only on (0;1); allowing a positive mass of buyers with value 0 or sellers
with value 1, consistent with our earlier discussion of “parking” extra players.
Example 1 Let sellers i 2 f1;:::;ng have vi degenerate at i=n and similarly
for buyers. NAG and NAA are satis…ed for w = W = 1: So, individual values
need neither have full support nor be non-atomic.
Example 2 Each Pi is continuous with density bounded by w and W:
Each of these two assumption has an analog in RSW. NAA is needed for a
rate of convergence result, but not for convergence itself.
3 z-Independence
Our …nal condition is the most important. We wish to relax independence con-
siderably while still requiring “some persistent independence” as the population
grows.
We require that knowledge about the values of players other than i provides
at most a …nite likelihood ratio on the values of player i; independent of how
many other players there are.
6De…nition 1 The sequence of probability measures fP ng satis…es z-independence,
z 2 (0;1]; if for all n; for all i 2 N; for any positive probability event F¡i in-
volving only v¡i and any positive probability event Fi involving only vi;




That is, there is still some idiosyncrasy in each vi even as the market becomes
large.8
For …xed n; z¡independence is slightly stronger than mutual absolute con-
tinuity (consider a uniform and a triangular distribution on [0;1]) but weaker
than having a continuous Radon-Nikodym derivative bounded from 0 and 1:
The real content of z-independence is in the uniformity of z across n.
Assumption 4 (z-independence) There exists z > 0 such that fP ng is z-
independent.
3.1 Examples
Example 3 With probability 1=2; players are drawn iid uniform [0;1], and with
probability 1=2; x is drawn uniformly from [1=n;1¡ 1=n]; and values are drawn
iid uniform [x ¡ 1=n;x + 1=n]: For each n; P n is absolutely continuous with
respect to
Q
Pi (and, the example is easily modi…ed such that the Radon-Nikodym
derivative is continuous as well). But, as n ! 1; seeing the values of two
randomly selected players within 2=n of each other makes it arbitrarily likely
that all remaining players will also have such a value.
We would like this example to be ruled out by our notion of “some persistent
independence.” A …rst thought might be to require that nomatter what weknow
about one subset of the players’ values, beliefs about the rest of the players’
values are updated by at most a …nite ratio. This turns out to be much too
strong.
Example 4 Nature chooses x 2 fL;Hg equiprobably. If L is drawn, values are
drawn iid according to density f(v) = 1=2+ v: If H is drawn, values are drawn
iid according to density f(v) = 3=2 ¡ v:
A …nite likelihood ratio condition fails if both events involve large numbers of
players. For example, let FO be the event that less than 50% of the odd numbered
buyers have value below 1/2, and let FE be the event that less than 50% of the
even numbered buyers have value below 1=2: Then, as n ! 1; Pr(FOjFE) ! 1;
while Pr(FOjF C
E ) ! 0: Since for each n; FE and F C
E have the same size, this
also means that the Radon-Nikodym derivative satis…es no uniform bound across
n:
8A contemporaneous paper by Peters and Severinov (2002) uses a similar condition (in a
di¤erent model) in a …nite type setting.
7This example exhibits a great deal of independence despite the fact that
likelihood ratios and Radon-Nikodym derivatives diverge. We would like to
admit it.
Note that Example 3 fails z-independence for any z > 0; as vi is, 1/2 of
the time, arbitrarily closely predicted by v¡i. However Example 4 satis…es
:5¡independence; all one can extract from v¡i is information about whether x
is L or H; which changes the density on vi from 1 to something between 1=2
and 3=2:
Example 4 generalizes to any process in which a state is sampled and then,
conditional on the state, values vi are drawn independently from measures with
non-moving support Vi according to densities uniformly bounded (across states
and n) away from zero and in…nity. So our setting encompasses Fudenberg
et al. (2003) (and more importantly, non-symmetric analogues to their model).
However, even with symmetry, z-independence admits many distributions which
cannot be generated in this way.











and 2=3 elsewhere. This satis…es 2
3-independence. One can generate this using
states and conditionally-independent values. In state µ1 (which occurs 1 time in










; while in state µ2 they are uniform on
[0;1] £ [0;1]: But, one cannot do so without shifting supports.
Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) de…ne non-exclusivity as asituation where
the information of n ¡ 1 players is enough to predict the relevant state of the
economy. A variety of follow-on papers relax this to hold only asymptotically.9
On …rst view, z-independence is antithetical to non-exclusivity, since no matter
how much is known about the rest of the players, the value of player i remains
uncertain. However, note that non-exclusivity refers to information about the
underlying state, not to the signals players realize conditional on those states.
In Example 4, v¡i is asymptotically fully informative about L vs. H; while of
bounded informativeness about vi. Hence Example 4 can satisfy both condi-
tions.
Example 6 Nature draws v1 uniformly from [0;1] (this person is a “fashion
leader”), and then draws subsequent players iid according to a density with sup-
port [0;1] but concentrated around v1:
Sincethe impact of an early draw on later draws does not vanish, z-independence
does not imply weak mixing. It is also easy to construct sequences satisfying
weak mixing under which successive draws are arbitrarily correlated, violating
z-independence.
Example 7 A parameter x is chosen from [0;1]. Values are drawn condi-
tionally independently according to f(:jx); where f(:jx) satis…es MLRP in x:
As long as f(:j0)=f(:j1) is uniformly bounded; z-independence is satis…ed for
9A good entry point is McLean and Postlewaite (2002).
8z = minx f(xj0)=f(xj1): Choose a subset of the players, and replace vi by 1¡vi:
This measure continues to satisfy z-independence; but is obviously not a¢liated.
So, a¢liation has essentially nothing to do with the issues at hand.
We close this subsection with an example illustrating the surprising degree
of correlation z-independence can imply. De…ne [x] as the largest integer smaller
than x:





n be the probability of m heads
from n ‡ips of a fair coin.10
Now, for some 0 < a < 1=2; generate ³C from ³B by …rst de…ning ³
0
C(m) =
³B(m)ajm¡[n=2]j; and then de…ning ³C from ³
0
C by normalizing. Informally one
makes each outcome successively further away from [n=2] more unlikely by a
factor of a: Choose m according to ³C; choose each subset of coins of size m
with equal probability, and make the coins in the subset heads, and the remainder
tails. When a is small, drawing exactly [n=2] heads by this process becomes very
probable.11 For a = :1; e.g., there is an 80% chance or exactly [n=2] heads
regardless of n:12
This process satis…es z-independence! If there are m0 heads among all but
coin i; the probability that i is heads is Pr(m = m0 + 1)=Pr(m = m0 + 1): By
construction, this is either a or 1=a:
Thus, z-independence does not imply limit “noise.” So the techniques in
Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (1997), and Swinkels
(2001) do not apply.
3.2 A Preliminary Lemma
Our …rst lemma shows that if values are z-independent then so too are bids. The
intuition for this is that bi is a garbling of vi.13 It also describes the implications
of z-independence for groups of players.





































As a ! 0; this tends to 1.




13A related lemma appears in JS.
9Throughout the paper, for any non-empty K ½ N; when we write FK (re-
spectively Fi;F¡i;FNnK), we mean an arbitrary positive probability event in-
volving only the values or bids of the players in K (fig;Nni;N nK).
Lemma 1 Fix a non-empty K ½ N . Let a = min fjKj;jNnKjg: Then for all
FK, and FN nK;
z
¡aPr(FK) ¸ Pr(FKjFNnK) ¸ z
aPr(FK): (2)
Let XK be a random variable that depends only on the values/bids of the
players in K. Then:
z
¡aE(XK) ¸ E(XKjFN nK) ¸ z
aE(XK): (3)
When a is large, these bounds are weak; for arbitrary events involving many
players, likelihood ratios can explode.
3.3 Large Deviations
Given K ½ N and events fFigi2K let QK be the number of Fi that are true.
Notice that E(QK) =
P
i2K Pr(Fi). Let us stochastically bound QK: Note …rst
that for each i;


























Since this is true for all F¡i we show that QK …rst order stochastically dominates
jKj independent coins with parameters pi:





Pr(Fi);1¡ z(1 ¡ Pr(Fi))
¾
stochastically dominate QK.
Sets of independent coins are well understood. We can apply the theory of
large deviations to obtain:

























10This casts light on Example 8. Under z-independence, probabilities that
start in the interior of (0;1) cannot be moved too far toward or away from







A useful implication of Lemma2 is that the probability of at least one success
is not drastically a¤ected by FNnK:
Corollary 1
Pr(QK ¸ 1 j FNnK) ¸
¡
1 ¡ e¡z¢
Pr(QK ¸ 1): (6)
3.4 Normal Realizations
We prove convergence at rate 1=n2¡® for any given ® > 0: It is convenient to …x
® now. We will need various fudge factors along the way. Choose ®1;®2;®3;®4
so that
® > ®1 > ®2 > ®3 > ®4 > 2®=3
Let w0 ´ z
6w and W 0 ´ 6
zW:
De…nition 2 A realization is normal if every interval I µ (0;1) of length
1=n1¡®=3 or greater has between w0njIj and W 0njIj buyers (respectively sell-
ers) with value in that interval.
Let N be the event that the realization is normal.
Say that a statement is true for n su¢ciently large (n SL) to mean that there
exists an n¤ depending only on the parameters such that the statement is true
for all n > n¤. Then, a key implication of Lemma 2 is
Lemma 3 For all n SL, Pr(N) ¸ 1 ¡ 1=n4:
Together with NAG and NAA, Lemma 3 implies that the limiting realized
true demand and supply curves are unlikely to have either verticalor ‡at sections
(except at 0 for buyers and 1 for sellers).14
4 Analysis of the Double Auction
4.1 Summing Deviations
Fix an equilibrium ¹ of An: Consider buyer i’s distributional strategy ¹i. A
deviation for i is a measurable mapping di from [0;1]2 to [0;1]. First i draws
14We show that percentage e¢ciency losses are asymptotically less than 1=n2¡®: As for
all rate of convergence results, this does not say anything about small n. The construction
underlying normality in particular only holds for n pretty large. We use normality to sidestep
a set of statistical issues related to the generality of our set-up, especially non-symmetry.
There seems to be nothing in the underlying incentives being exploited that precludes much
faster convergence, and our expectation would be that actual convergence is indeed very fast.
RSW supplement their rate result (where the constant is again large) with numerically solved
examples. Such solutions are beyond our ability in this setting.
11vi and bi according to ¹i; but then she modi…es her chosen bid according to di.
Consider di for which bi · di(bi;vi) · vi 8bi;vi. That is, i sometimes raises her
bid, but not beyond her true value (since ¹i did not involve i bidding more than
her true value, this is coherent).
In any given realization, di may have bene…t ^ Bi in that i wins when he
otherwise would not have, or may have cost ^ Ci that i pays more when he would
have already won. To formalize this, let p be price under ¹; and pd the price
when i uses di: Let Wi be the event that i wins with di; but not without. Then
Bi ´ E( ^ Bi) = Pr(Wi)E (vi ¡ pdjWi):
Let Oi ½ W c
i be the event that i wins without di: Then
Ci ´ E( ^ Ci) = Pr(Oi)E(pd ¡ pjOi):











NB Ci. Ex-post, ^ Ci > 0 only if (a) trade was occurring and (b)
the original bi was equal to cg; and uniquely so. When bi > cg (or is tied at
cg), increasing bi does not a¤ect p. If bi < cg, increasing bi may increase p; but
as i was not originally winning, she is unhurt. So, there is at most one i with
^ Ci > 0:15 And, as discussed above, for this i, ^ Ci · jugj: Thus,
X
NB
Ci · Pr(T)E (jugjjT):
For sellers, the same analysis applies if bids are lowered, but not below value.
We have thus established:
Lemma 4 For any set fdigi2NB, for which di(bi;vi) 2 [bi;vi] for all (bi;vi)
X
NB
Bi · Pr(T)E (jugjjT) : (7)
For any set fdigi2NS, for which di(bi;vi) 2 [vi;bi] for all (bi;vi)
X
NS
Bi · Pr(T)E (jlgjjT): (8)
While easy to prove, this bound is powerful. Independent of the number
of bidders, the total bene…t to players of bidding more aggressively in terms of
making new trades must be small in equilibrium.
15If cg is a seller’s bid, no buyer is hurt by di.
124.2 The Probability of Trade is Bounded from Zero
An important …rst step is to show that non-trivial equilibria are not “almost
trivial” in the sense that trade becomes increasingly rare as n grows. For each n;
choose a non-trivial equilibrium of An: Let V be the number of objects traded
and T be the event that V 6= 0.
Our …rst lemma is technical.
Lemma 5 Along any subsequence, if
E(V jT)
n 6! 0; then Pr(T) ! 1.
Intuitively, if many players trade given T, then many players must occa-
sionally be bidding in a fairly aggressive way. But then, by z-independence, at
least a fraction of them will be doing so almost all the time. The proof is more
complicated because T is linked to all player’s actions, and so z-independence
does not immediately apply.
Using Lemma 5, we can show:
Proposition 1 There is ° > 0 such that for all n SL, and all non-trivial equi-
libria,
Pr(T) ¸ °:
For intuition, think about a situation where in aggregate buyers only make a
“serious” o¤er with some probability ± close to 0, and symmetrically for sellers
(clearly, if there is a non-vanishing probability of a serious o¤er on either side,
trade will not disappear). Trade occurs at most 2± of the time, since trade
requires a serious o¤er from at least one side. Hence, by Lemma 4, the total
costs to buyers (or sellers) of making more generous o¤ers is like (has the same
order as) ±: But, from z-independence, the probability of a serious o¤er from
one side but not the other is like (1 ¡ ±) ± » = ±: But, when there is a serious o¤er
on one side but not the other, a number of bidders on the other side that grows
like n would have bene…ted by deviating to grab the serious o¤er. The gains
are thus like n±; while costs are like ±: This is a contradiction.
4.3 Small Supporting Gaps
We show next that the upper and lower supporting gaps shrink quickly. This
proceeds in two steps. First, we show that E(jugj) (respectively E(jlgj)) is like
1=n: The idea is most easily seen if for each n; ug has constant length À: By
Lemma 3, a number of buyers proportional to nÀ will have vi in the top half
of ug: At most one of these buyers is winning an object (they are not bidding
above ug; as bids are below value, and only one bid below ug is …lled). By
raising bi to v ¡ À=4 all but this player (acting unilaterally) would win an extra
object and earn at least À=4. So,
P
Bi ¸ nÀ2 (up to some constants). But by
Lemma 4,
P










13from which À ·
1
n: The actual proof has to count for the fact that jugj is
stochastic, as are the number of bidders in any given interval. Formally:
Lemma 6 For n SL and all x;
E(jugj) ·
1
n1¡®4 ; E(jlgj) ·
1
n1¡®4
Fix x; and consider Pr(jugj ¸ x): Consider again buyers raising bi to v ¡x=4:
When jugj ¸ x; then as above, a number of buyers like nx makes gains x=4; and
so
P
Bi = nx2 (again ignoring constants). And,
P
Ci · E (jugj) · 1=n from






from which Pr(jugj ¸ x) · 1
n2x2: Formally
Lemma 7 For n SL and all x,
Pr(jugj ¸ x) ·
1
n2¡®3x2 ; Pr(jlgj ¸ x) ·
1
n2¡®3x2 :
For x ¸ 0, let LB(x) be those buyers with values above cg + x that do not
receive an object, and let lB(x) ´ #LB(x). Similarly let LS(x) be those sellers








For buyers, this is the loss in consumer surplus compared with being able to
price take at cg; and analogously for sellers. Lemma 6 implies that both the
number of such players and the associated loss is small. The intuition again
comes from considering players bidding closer to their values.
Lemma 8 For n SL and for all x;
E(lB(x)) ·
1









4.4 Small Competitive Gaps
Let us now turn to the competitive gap. Our key lemma:
Lemma 9 For n SL and for all x;
Pr(jcgj ¸ x) ·
1
n2¡®2x2 :





that n prespeci…ed bidders always bid above ¹ I (up) and the rest always bid
below I (down). Then, the competitive gap will always include I: And, since
the probability of trade is bounded away from 0; the set of up bidders must
contain a buyer, and the set of down bidders a seller. But then, by bidding
I + ", any up buyer can still trade and force the price near the bottom of I;
while by bidding ¹ I ¡ ", any down seller can still trade and force the price near
¹ I; contradicting equilibrium.
If this situation arises only in the limit then the buyer or seller occasionally
loses a trade by bidding more aggressively, but this becomes unlikely. Finally
(because this is what we will really need), imagine that I shrinks as n grows.
Then, as the gain from a¤ecting the market price shrinks, we must be careful
that the loss from lost trades shrinks as well. To do this, pick a buyer whose
value is not too much above ¹ I, so that his value of trade was quite small, and
a seller whose value was not too much below I: The e¢ciency of the allocation
among buyers and sellers (Lemma 8) lets us to do this.
We show that if Lemma 9 fails, then the limit is as described. For intuition,
assume there is some interval I of length x such that nobody ever bids in I, and
such that Pr(I µ cg) does not fall quickly: Let pi be the probability that i bids
up, and qi the probability of down. Order the players so that pi is increasing.
Run along them stopping at the player i where one counts n¡1 ups. For I µ cg;
we need to hit exactly one more up in the rest of the sequence. If one hits no
more ups, I µ ug; while if one hits 2 more ups, I µ lg; either of which is rare by
Lemma 7. But, we argue, the only way to make 1 more up likely, but neither
0 nor 2 more ups likely is for the next player to have pi+1 nearly 1; and for
the remaining players to in aggregate have almost no chance of even one up.
Essentially, if pi+1 is not near one, then, since pi is decreasing, the probability
on who is the nth up is “spread out”. But then, z-independence makes it likely
that one also over or undershoots by 1. And, given that the next player is
likely to hit, there must rarely be any more hits in the remaining population.
Running through the players in reverse order and counting downs, when one
hits n¡1 downs, the next one must almost certainly play down, and then there
must almost never be any more downs. Since both of these are true at once,
in aggregate, the …rst n bidders almost always bid up and the remaining down.
Hence, Pr(I µ cg) ! 1:
The proof is long: cg can move around, sometimes including one interval
and sometimes another, players might bid not only above or below any given I,
but sometimes within it, and one must be careful not to double count the ways
in which a population “one player away” from creating a long cg might end up
creating a long supporting gap.
4.5 E¢ciency
We are now ready for our main theorem:
15Theorem 1 All non-trivial equilibria of the single unit demand/supply double
auction are asymptotically e¢cient. Uniformly across non-trivial equilibria, ef-
…ciency losses go to zero faster than 1=n1¡® for any given ® > 0: The fraction
of expected surplus lost compared to a Walrasian market thus shrinks as 1=n2¡®.
For intuition, note that in Section 4.3 we showed that the e¢ciency loss
from failing to trade objects between sellers with value below cg and buyers
with values above cg is small (of order 1=n). So, the only e¢ciency losses to
worry about are from pairs of buyers and sellers both having value in cg. The
loss from missing such a trade is at most jcgj: And, using NAA, the number
of such buyers and sellers is like jcgjn. So, the deadweight loss triangle from
too little trade has area jcgj
2 n. But, from Lemma 9, Pr(jcgj ¸ x) · 1
n2¡®x2;
and so the expected loss here is like 1=n as well. Finally, from NAG, expected
feasible surplus grows like n; and so proportional losses are like 1=n2: A formal
accounting of e¢ciency losses is subsumed by the proof of the multiple unit case,
and so omitted in the appendix.
4.6 Asymptotic Uniqueness of Equilibrium
In the space of allocations, all non-trivial equilibria converge to the Walrasian
outcome. Over “relevant” ranges bids must thus converge to true values. So,
if in the limit, the Walrasian price is either p1 or p2 > p1; then, players with
value near p1 or p2 must bid close to value. But it is di¢cult to show that a
player, e.g., with value well above p2 must bid near value. A rate of convergence
result for bids is thus cumbersome. Intuitively, over relevant ranges convergence
should be order 1=n.
5 Multiple-Unit Demands and Supplies
Assume now that each player has demand or supply for at most m units, for
some …xed m. For buyers, let vih; h 2 f1;:::;mg; be i’s incremental value for
unit h.16 For sellers, let vih be the incremental cost of unit h. We assume
vih is non-increasing in h for buyers and non-decreasing for sellers. Bids are
(non-increasing for buyers, non-decreasing for sellers) m¡vectors. JS applies to
show existence of equilibria in this setting, subject to the same strengthenings
as before.
We assume the following version of NAG.
Assumption 5 (No Asymptotic Gaps¤) There is w > 0 such that for all n;
and for all intervals I µ (0;1) of length 1=n or greater,
X
i2NB
Pi[vi1 2 I] ¸ wnjIj
16As before, we include atoms for buyers at 0 and sellers at 1. So, this does not imply that
buyers have positive value for all m units or that sellers are want or are able to sell m units.
16and X
i2NS
Pi[vi1 2 I] ¸ wnjIj:
That is, when n is large, there are many buyers whose highest value might
fall in any given interval, and many sellers whose lowest cost might fall into any
given interval.17
As before, z-independence applies only across players, and does not restrict
the relationship of the di¤erent values of any given player. NAA is assumed to
apply to all values, not just the …rst. So, not too many vih fall in any given
interval.
Theorem 2 With NAG¤, Theorem 1 continues to hold even with multiple-unit
demands and supplies.
Most of the incentive arguments rely only on the highest value unit of de-
mand for buyers and lowest cost unit for sellers. The proof proceeds in two
steps. De…ne ug as the mth bid up from cg; and ug as (cg;ug): In the appendix,
we show that Lemma 7 continues to hold for this de…nition of ug. The modi-
…cation to the intuition is very small: when ug is long, there are many buyers
with highest value in the top half of ug: But, only m of them can be winning a
…rst object. Given this, Lemma 9 is easily extended as well. Instead of sorting
players into those who play “up” and “down”, sort them into those who make
0 up bids, 1 up bid, etc. This is notationally intensive but straightforward and
hence omitted.
Finally, we must show that since jugj;jcgj and jlgj shrink quickly, ine¢ciency
in the market disappears as 1=n: A proof of this is in the appendix. To see the
issues involved, note that for the single unit case (and for the …rst unit of demand
in the multiple unit case), a buyer’s impact on the price is small for two reasons.
First, he is unlikely to be pivotal. Second, even if he is pivotal, he doesn’t a¤ect
the price much, since the next bid up is likely to be close. We exploit both of
these forces in showing Lemma 7 and Lemma 9 and their adaptations here.
For units of demand after their …rst, many buyers can simultaneously be in
the position that in raising bids other than their …rst, they pay more for units
they were already winning. To get around this, consider the deviation to honest
bidding. In any given realization, let x be ug ¡cg: This is the maximum impact
of i raising his m bids on price. If vih < cg; then the deviation is irrelevant.
If cg · vih · cg + 2mx; then i may not bene…t very much from any new
unit won by raising bih, and may hurt himself by raising the price by as much
as x on each of m ¡ 1 units already being won. But, critically, because of
NAA, the number of vih in (cg;cg + 2mx) is only like nx (as always, ignoring
constants). So, the expected cost to bidders from this case is like E(nx2): But,
the modi…ed versions of Lemma 7 and Lemma 9 give that E(nx2) is like 1=n:
17There are less restrictive ways in which one might generalize NAG. For example, if each
buyer’s …rst value is uniform [3;4]; and their second value is uniform [0;vi1] then there are
many buyer values in each range. An example in Section 5.1 of Swinkels (2001), suggests that
this is not strong enough to gaurantee e¢ciency.
17And, the expected e¢ciency loss from such players not winning also falls like
1=n:
Consider objects with vih above cg +2mx where i is already winning an hth
object. As before, only one of the associated bids can be cg: So, the sum of
costs in terms of raising these bids is at most x: And, E(x) · 1=n as well.
The remaining objects have vih above cg + 2mx but are not winning. But,
then the deviation to v wins an extra object at price at most cg + x; and raises
the price by at most x on m ¡ 1 units, for a net pro…t of vih ¡ cg ¡ mx: The
e¢ciency loss from i not winning object h is at most vih ¡cg; which, given that
vih ¡ cg > 2mx; is at most twice vih ¡ cg ¡ x: So, on these objects, bidder’s
pro…ts from the deviation are at least half of the e¢ciency loss on these units.
Since costs from raising bids on other units are insigni…cant, it follows that the
e¢ciency loss on these units is small since otherwise bidders will in aggregate
have a pro…table deviation. As the e¢ciency loss on other units is also small,
we are done.
6 Extensions
6.1 One-sided Uniform-price Auctions
Swinkels (2001) considers large one-sided auctions with independent values and
a little bit of “noise.” An example is if there is a small independent probability
that each player sleeps through the auction. In the uniform price case, it is
shown that with the noise, the impact that any given player has on the price
grows small in expectation. But then, since “honest” bidding has a small e¤ect
on the price paid, it must also have little bene…t in winning extra objects. This
implies asymptotic e¢ciency (without a rate of convergence).
An easy extension to the arguments here shows that a one sided uniform price
auction with z¡independent values converges to e¢ciency at rate 1=n2¡®; even
without noise. This paper thus signi…cantly generalizes Swinkels (2001) for the
uniform price case. The key is that here we think of “cost” as the impact on price
in circumstances where the player a¤ecting the price cares. This is a simpler
object to bound, allowing both the greater generality, and fast convergence.18
6.2 Weaker Information Assumptions
We can weaken the information assumptions considerably. There is no problem
if most players have considerably more knowledge about each other’s values than
z¡independence allows. What counts (for convergence, rates are more delicate)
is that from the point of view of a non-vanishing fraction of players, there are
“lots” of players who he cannot predict precisely, and that NAG applies to this
set of players.
18The stronger notion of vanishing impact is needed to prove results for discriminatory
auctions, which are also analyzed in that paper.
186.3 Non-private Values
We can also weaken the assumption of private values somewhat. Assume that
an " fraction of the players have private values, and the remainder some sort
of common. The arguments above show that over relevant ranges, the players
with private values bid close to value. NAG implies that their bids are then
closely packed almost surely. Thus, the impact of bids on price disappears
for all players. But then, common value types should bid nearly “honestly”
(their bid should nearly equal the expected value of object conditional on being
pivotal). Working out such a model is left to future work.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proofs for Section 3.2
Proof of Lemma 1 Wlog, let K = f1;2;:::;jKjg. Let PK and PN nK be the
marginals of P on K and N nK respectively, and let PK£N nK be the associated









Pr(FijFi+1 \:::\ FjKj) (using z ¡ independence)
= z
¡jKj Pr(FK) = z
¡jKjPK(FK):
Analogously,
Pr(FKjFN nK) ¸ zjKjPK(FK):
These inequalities extend to any FK in the product ¾-algebra, as such a set is
the limit of a countable union of rectangles. Thus
z¡jKj Pr(FK)Pr(FN nK) ¸ Pr(FK \ FNnK) ¸ zjKj Pr(FK) Pr(FNnK) (9)
20or equivalently
z
¡jKjPK£NnK ¸ P ¸ z
jKjPK£N nK: (10)




















The …rst integral is de…ned by the players’ distributional strategies. The second
line uses (10). The third line applies Fubini’s Theorem. The …nal line integrates.
Similarly Pr(FK \ FN nK) ¸ zjKj Pr(FK)Pr(FN nK) so (9) holds for all events.
Similarly, for rectangular events FNnK;
z
¡jNnKj Pr(FK)Pr(FNnK) ¸ Pr(FK \ FN nK) ¸ z




¡aPr(FK)Pr(FNnK) ¸ Pr(FK \ FN nK) ¸ z
a Pr(FK)Pr(FN nK) (12)
Dividing through by Pr(FNnK) gives (2).
Let XK be a step function with values x® on a …nite partition fF ®g®2A
where each F ® is an event on bids and values in K. By the de…nition of condi-
tional expectation E(XKjFNnK) =
P




x® Pr(F ®) = z¡aE(XK):
Analogously, E(XKjFKnN) ¸ zaE(XK): As an arbitrary XK is the limit of such
step functions, (3) follows. ¥
7.2 Proofs for Section 3.3
Proof of Lemma 2 Wlog, let K = f1;2;:::;·g. De…ne the Bernoulli process
with · independent trials with success probability pi in trial i. Let xi 2 f0;1g
be the outcome of trial i and let Xk =
Pk
i=1 xi. We claim that XK ´ X· FOSD
QK given FNnK. The proof is inductive. Let Qk be the number of F1;:::;Fk¡1
that occur. Trivially, X0 FOSD Q0; since both are identically 0: Suppose X k¡1
21FOSD Qk¡1 given FN nK: Then, for r 2 f0;:::;kg;
Pr(Q
k · r j FN nK) = Pr(Q




k¡1 = rg \FNnK)Pr(Q
k¡1 = r j FN nK)
¸ Pr(X
k¡1 < r j FNnK) + (1¡ pk)Pr(X
k¡1 = r j FN nK)
= Pr(XK · r):
The inequality uses z-independence and the inductive hypothesis.
Similarly, if YK is the number of successes in a Bernoulli process with success
probabilities p
i then given FN nK; QK FOSD YK.
We want a large-deviations inequality for the bounding Bernoulli processes.
As XK is a sum of non-identical independent Bernoulli trials, a slight alteration



























= 0 trivially when ¼Á ¸ 1:





































1 ¡ x + xe¸=·¼¢










¡¸Á + · log
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Á¼ ¡ · log
³
1 ¡ ¼ + ¼e¸=·¼
´¾¸
= exp [¡· fsÁ¼ ¡ log(1 ¡ ¼ + ¼es)g];
where s ´
¸
·¼: Given that ¸ > 0 was arbitrary, this holds for all s > 0; and so












































· exp [¡·¼(Á logÁ + 1 ¡ Á)]: (15)
Choosing Á = 3;












i2K pi ¸ E(QK); and so e¡·¼ · e¡E(QK): Finally, XK stochastically














The proof for YK is similar: De…ne ¼ =
P
i2K pi: Then, for any ¸ < 0; and




























: Note in particular that since ¸ < 0; s ´ ¸
·¼ can













· exp [¡·¼(ÁlogÁ + 1 ¡ Á)]: (17)
Note that
P
i2K pi ¸ zE(QK);sothat Pr(YK < ÁzE(QK)) · Pr (YK < Á·¼)
and exp [¡·¼(ÁlogÁ + 1 ¡ Á)] · exp[¡zE(QK)(ÁlogÁ + 1 ¡ Á)]: So,
Pr(QK < ÁzE(QK)) · e¡zE(QK)(Á log Á+1¡Á): (18)
Since 1
3 log 1
3 + 1¡ 1
3 > 0:3; (4) follows ¥
Proof of Corollary 1 Note that Pr(QK = 0jFNnK) · Pr(QK · ÁE(QK)) for
any Á > 0: Equation 18 then gives




· e¡zE(QK)(Á log Á+1¡Á)
· e¡z Pr(QK¸1)(Á log Á+1¡Á)











For x 2 (0;1], (1 ¡ e¡zx)=x is minimized at x = 1. ¥
7.3 Proofs for Section 3.4
Proof of Lemma 3 Partition [0;1] into k ´
£
n1¡®=4¤
intervals fI·g of equal
length (between n1¡®=4 and 2n1¡®=4). Let QB(I·) be the number of buyers
with values in I·: Note that
Wn=k = Wn jI·j ¸ E(QB(I·)) ¸ wnjI·j = wn=k:
Let E1· ´ f3
zW n=k ¸ QB(I·) ¸ z
3wn=kg: By Lemma 2,




for n SL, since n=k ! n®=4. Similarly, let QS(I·) be the number of sellers with
values in I·; and de…ne E2· =
© 3
zWn=k ¸ QS(I) ¸ z
3wn=k
ª
: Then, Pr(E2·) ¸
1 ¡ 1
n5 for n SL.
Then, N ´ \· (E1· \ E2·). As this involves 2k · 2n1¡®=4 events,
Pr(N) ¸ 1 ¡ 2
n1¡®=4
n5 (19)
¸ 1 ¡ 1=n
4
for n SL.
Finally, note that for n SL, any interval I of length at least 1
n1¡®=3contains










Similarly, I intersects with at most 2kjIj=n elements of fI·g and so QB(I) ·
6
zW jIj: The argument for QS(I) is analogous. ¥
Proofs for Section 4.2
Proof of Lemma 5 If
E(V jT)
n 6! 0; then along a subsequence, Pr(V > °njT) >
° for some °: Given fV > °ng; if one selects
° n
2 of the buyers at random, the
probability that none trades is at most (1 ¡ °)
°n
2 · 1=8 for n SL, and so there is
a 7/8 probability of at least one trader. Since this is true in expectation, it must
be true for some particular set GB of
°n
2 buyers. Similarly, there is a set GS
24of °n=2 sellers such that conditional on fV > °ng at least one is a trader with
probability 7/8. Let G ´ GS [ GB, and let TG be the event that at least one
buyer and one seller in G trades. Then, Pr(TGjfV > °ng) ¸ 1¡ 2(1=8) = 3=4:
So, Pr(TG \fV > °ng) ¸ 3=4Pr(V > °n) : As TG µ T,
Pr(fV > °ngjTG) =






Since G has only
°n
2 buyers or sellers, TG \ fV > °ng implies that there
are at least
°n
2 buyers and sellers trading in NnG: Let X be this event. So,
Pr(XjTG) ¸ 3°=4:
Let p¤ be such that Pr(p ¸ p¤jX \TG) ¸ 1
2 and Pr(p · p¤jX \TG) ¸ 1
2: Let
QS be the number of sellers in NnG with bi · p¤ and QB the number of buyers
in NnG with bi ¸ p¤: Then,
















Pr(bi · p¤) ¸ z
X
i2NSnG
Pr(bi · p¤jTG) = zE(QSjTG) = 3z°2n=16:
Thus by Lemma 2 Pr(QS = 0) ! 0: Similarly Pr(QB = 0) ! 0: But then,
Pr(T) ! 1: ¥
Proof of Proposition 1 Fix An and a non-trivial equilibrium. Let ÁB ´
maxNB bi be the highest buy bid submitted and let ÁS ´ minNS bi be the
lowest sell bid. Note that Pr(ÁB ¸ x) is decreasing and continuous from the
left. Similarly, Pr(ÁS · x) is increasing and continuous from the right. Let
v¤ 2 [0;1] have the property that for all x 2 [0;v¤); Pr(ÁB ¸ x) ¸ Pr(ÁS ¸ x);
while for all x 2 (v¤;1]; Pr(ÁB ¸ x) · Pr(ÁS ¸ x): Let
± ´ min fPr(ÁB ¸ v¤);Pr(ÁS · v¤)g:
Note that Pr(ÁB > v¤) · ±: This is trivial if Pr(ÁB ¸ v¤) = ±. If Pr(ÁB ¸
v¤) > ±; then Pr(ÁS ¸ v¤) = ±: But then since Pr(ÁS · x) is continuous from
the right,





= Pr(ÁS ¸ v) = ±:
25Analogously, Pr(ÁS < v¤) · ±.
Assume that Pr(ÁS · v¤) = ±: Then, Pr (T \ fp · v¤g) · Pr(ÁS · v¤) = ±;
while Pr (T \fp > v¤g) · Pr(ÁB > v¤) · ±: Similarly, if Pr(ÁB ¸ v¤) = ±;
then, Pr (T \fp < v¤g) · Pr(ÁS < v¤) · ±; while Pr(T \ fp ¸ v¤g) · Pr(ÁB ¸
v¤) = ±: So Pr(T) · 2±:
Now, fÁS · v¤g = [i2NS fbi · v¤g. Hence, by Corrolary 1,
Pr(ÁS · v
¤ j FNB) ¸ (1 ¡ e
¡z)Pr(ÁS · v
¤) (20)
¸ (1 ¡ e
¡z)±
for any FNB: So,
Pr(T) ¸ Pr(fÁB ¸ v
¤g\ fÁS · v
¤g) (21)
¸ Pr(ÁS · v
¤ j ÁB ¸ v
¤) Pr(ÁB ¸ v
¤)
¸ (1 ¡ e
¡z)±
2:
Assume that v¤ · 1=2: (If not, the proof below applies, mutatis mutandis,
to the sellers). Fix an arbitrary buyer i. Let Á
i







= 1 ¡ Pr (ÁB ¸ 2=3)
¸ 1 ¡ Pr (ÁB > v¤)
¸ 1 ¡ ±:
Let J ´ [5=6;1]. By Lemma 1,
Pr(Á
i
B < 2=3 j vi 2 J) ¸ z (1 ¡ ±): (22)
By (20),
Pr(ÁS · v
¤ j vi 2 J;Á
i
B < v
¤) ¸ (1¡ e
¡z)±: (23)
Let di be the deviation for i that whenever vi 2 J and the original strategy
speci…ed a bid below v¤, he bids 2/3 instead. Under this strategy, he wins an
object with probability at least Pr(Á
i
B < 2=3;ÁS · v¤;vi 2 J), which by (22)
and (23) is at least





and earns at least 1
6 when he does so. So,







where ¼i is i’s expected equilibrium pro…t.
Summing across buyers, and applying Lemma 4,









Pr(vi 2 J) ¡
X
NB
¼i · Pr(T): (24)
26By A2
P
NB Pr(vi 2 J) ¸
1
6wn for n ¸ 6: As the gains to a buyer from any
given trade are at most 1, and V buyers trade,
X
NB
¼i · Pr(T)E(V j T):
Substituting into (24) gives






wn ¡ 2±Pr(T)E(V j T) · Pr(T):
Using Pr(T) · 2±; and dividing through by 2± > 0 gives
1
72
wz(1 ¡ ±)(1¡ e¡z)n ¡ E(V j T) · 1:
For this to hold for large n; either (1 ¡ ±) must be close to 0, in which case,
Pr(T) ¸ (1¡ e¡z)±
2 6! 0 (by (21)) or, E(V j T) must grow like n: But then, by
Lemma 5, Pr(T) ! 1: ¥
7.4 Proofs for Section 4.3
We will prove stronger results that will be useful when we turn to the multiple
unit case. Fix an integer m ¸ 1: Rede…ne ug as the mth bid above cg: As before,
let ug ´ (cg;ug): When m = 1; we have the original case.
Proof of Lemma 6 Let À ´ E(jugj); and let us show that for n SL, À · 1
n1¡®4.
Assume this is false along a subsequence. Then

























































































Consider di(bi;vi) = maxfbi;vi ¡ À





: Since jugj > À
2;
any buyer in the top half of jugj is a winner after di, and at most m were winners
before (since buyers bid at most vi; and by de…nition, there are only m bids in





27for n SL), the number of new winners is at least w0 1
2njugj¡m ¸
w0
4 njugj for n
SL. Each new winner earns at least
À



































But, by Lemma 4,
P













For n SL, this contradicts À ¸ 1
n1¡®4: The argument for sellers is analogous. ¥
Proof of Lemma 7 Assume Pr(jugj > x) > 1
x2n2¡®3 along a subsequence where
x > 1
n1¡®3=2 (for smaller x; 1
x2n2¡®3 ¸ 1; and the claim is vacuous). Then, for n
SL
Pr(N \ fjugj > xg) > Pr (fjugj > xg) ¡
1
n4 > Pr(fjugj > xg)=2:
Consider di(bi;vi) = maxfbi;vi ¡
x
2g: As before, given N \ fjugj > xg; Lemma
3 implies that there are w0nx ¡ m > w0nx=2 new winners, each earning x=2
(note that x > 1
n1¡®3=2 > 1
n1¡a=3, so Lemma 3 does apply). So,
X
NS















Pr (jugj > x) ·
4
w0n2¡®4:
For n SL, this contradicts Pr(jugj > x) > 1
x2n2¡®3 . ¥
Proof of Lemma 8 For buyer i; consider di(bi;vi) ´ maxfbi;vi ¡ xg. If



















(This is easily seen by noting that SLB(1=n) is a consumer surplus calculation





















n1¡®3 (for n SL)
which establishes the second claim. Repeat for sellers. ¥
7.5 Proofs for Section 4.4
Proof of Lemma 9 Suppose the lemma is false, so that there exists a sequence
fntg, fxtg satisfying nt ! 1 and xt ¸ 1=n
1¡®2=2




t (the claim is vacuous for smaller xt).
Step 1. Sparse Intervals.
Recall from the proof of Lemma 3 the partition of [0;1] into k ´
£
n1¡®=4¤
disjoint intervals fI·g of equal length between 1=n1¡®=4 and 2=n1¡®=4. Let
M(I·) be the number of bids in I·. Let ! = zw0=24: Say I· is sparse if






be the event that there are not “too many” bids in
I·: For any given ¿ 2 [0;1] consider the process in which at step one, values
and bids are drawn according to the distributional strategy ¹; and at stage two,
each bid is randomly and independently replaced by a bid in I· with probabilty
¿: Let M¿(I·) be the random variable given the number of bids in I· for this
process. Clearly, M¿(I·) stochastically dominates M(I·) for any ¿: Choose ¿ ¤
such that E(M¿¤(I·)) = !n®=4: Then, Lemma 2 implies that


















be the event that there are not
“too few” bids in I·: Lemma 2 implies that for n SL




Let N 0 ´ N \ (\·E3·). Arguing as in the proof of Lemma 3, for n SL
Pr(N
0) ¸ 1 ¡ 3
n1¡®=4
n5 (27)
¸ 1 ¡ 1=n
4:
Step 2. Sparse Regions and the Endpoints of Competitive Gaps. Assemble
maximal groups of adjacent sparse intervals into sparse regions. Let fJ ¸g¸2¤
be the set of sparse regions that are longer than x
2. For n SL, z
3!n®=4 > 1: So,
given N0, for all n SL, each non-sparse interval contains at least 1 bid and so cg
cannot contain a non-sparse interval; cg can include at most a J¸ and parts of
the two non-sparse intervals immediately adjacent. These two intervals, having
length at most 2=n1¡®=4 become arbitrarily short compared to x ¸ 1=n1¡®2=2:
Hence, given N 0; and for n SL a competitive gap of length x must (a) have
intersection of length at least x=2 with some J ¸; and (b) intersect at most one
J ¸:
Let J ¸
y , y 2 [0;1] be the point a yth of the way up the interval J ¸. Our …rst
lemma says that it is very unlikely that the competitive gap ends a long way
from the end of a J ¸.



















Proof Consider the event
n




\N 0 for some ¸ 2 ¤. Let y ´ J¸
1 ¡
cg: As cg 2 [J ¸
0 ;J ¸




1 ¡ y=2;J ¸
1
¤
is at least w0yn=2: On the other hand, by Step 1, given
N 0; each I· µ
£
J ¸








w0n®=4=8 bids. For n SL, this implies that the number of bids in
£
J ¸
1 ¡ y=2;J ¸
1
¤
is at most w0yn=4 (by the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 3). Thus,
given
n




\ N 0; there are at least w0yn=2 ¡ w0yn=4 = w0yn=4






but bid below cg = J ¸







As cg 2 [J ¸
0 ;J ¸
4=5]; y ¸ x=5: So, whenever
n

























































Now, for n SL x
10 > 1
n;and hence SLB( x
10) < SLB( 1
n): However, E(SLB(1=n)) ·
1





























for n SL. Repeat for sellers in the lower …fth to get the second claim. ¥
Step 4. Relative Probabilities of competitive and supporting gaps. Let cg¸ ´ n




; and let c¸ ´ Pr(cg¸): Similar, let lg¸ ´
n





and l¸ ´ Pr(lg¸): Finally, let ug¸ ´
n




; and u¸ ´ Pr(ug¸).
Our next lemma shows that for some ¸; c¸ is both non-trivial, and much larger
than either l¸ or u¸:




















6n®2¡2x¡2. By Lemma 10, the probability of a competitive gap in J¸ not
including the middle 3/5 is also less than 1








t . Let ¤0 denote the subset of regions with c¸ > 1=n4:

















From Lemma 7, for n SL
P
¸2¤0 l¸ + u¸ · 2n®3¡2x¡2. Thus
P








for n SL. Since this is true on average, it must be true for at least one ¸ 2 ¤0.¥
In what follows, we refer to a ¸ for which Lemma 11 holds. Let ~ c ´ Pr(cg ¶
[J ¸
2=5;J ¸
3=5]) be the probability of a competitive gap including the middle …fth
of J¸: We will show that ~ c is close to 1. The idea is that the only way to have
c¸ be large relative to u = u¸ and l = l¸ will be for players to almost always
get it almost right.
Let Ui ´ fbi ¸ J¸
4=5g be the event that i bids up and ~ Ui ´ fbi ¸ J ¸
2=5g
be the event that i bids weakly up. Symmetrically, let Di ´ fbi · J ¸
1=5g
and ~ Di ´ fbi · J¸
3=5g be the events that i bids down and weakly down. Let
pi ´ Pr(Ui), ~ pi ´ Pr( ~ Ui), qi ´ Pr(Di) and ~ qi ´ Pr( ~ Di). Order the players so
that ~ q1 · ~ q2 · ::: · ~ q2n.
Step 5. A preliminary inequality. De…ne
Ai
¡j ´ \j0>i;j06=jDj
as the event that all players after i not including j bid down. Then, for any
event F involving 1;2;:::;i,
Pr(Ai
¡j j F) ·
Y
j0>i;j06=j














(Pr(Dj0 j Dj0¡1;:::;Di+1;F ) ¡ 1)
3














j0>i;j06=j 1¡qj0 (by z-independence)
· e¡z
P




Step 6. Two Bounds: Recall that cg¸ ´
n






¸ ; i < j; be





¸ ): Let F i be the event that Uj0 holds for j 0 = i and for







= Pr(UjjF i \ Ai
¡j)Pr(F i \ Ai
¡j)
=
Pr( ~ Dj j F i \ Ai
¡j)
Pr( ~ Dj j F i \ Ai
¡j)
Pr(UjjF i \ Ai





Pr( ~ Dj j F i \ Ai





Pr( ~ Dj \ F i \ Ai
¡j):
Let ugi
¸ be the event ug¸; where i is the last player to bid up, and let ui
¸ =
Pr(ugi
¸): When ~ Dj\F i\Ai
¡j holds, i is the last player to bid up and in total n¡1
players bid up while the rest bid weakly down. Thus,
n




and so Pr( ~ Dj \ F i \ Ai
¡j) · ui









Another bound on c
ij













Step 7. Up and Down Players. We next show that for all n SL, Pr( ~ Di) · 1
4 for
i · n; and Pr(~ Ui) ¸ 1
4 for i > n:






¸ be the probability that cg¸ occurs, where i is
the second last up player. Let i¤ · n be the last index with the property that P
























So, as c¸ =
P
i¸n¡1 ci



















































Comparing the …rst and last expressions, ~ qn ! 0; and so in particular, qi · 1=4
all i · n for all n SL.
If the players are ordered so that ~ pi increases, this argument can be repeated
considering events in which n ¡ 1 of the …rst i players bid down and the others
bid up. Thus there are n players for which ~ pi ! 0. As ~ pi + ~ qi ¸ 1 these players
are disjoint from players 1;:::;n; and so must be the players fn + 1;:::;2ng.
Let R ´ \i·nUi \i>n Di = cg
n¡1;n
¸ be the event that all the players bid
according to their type (and a competitive gap occurs).











4. Since R is the only
34event left, it would then follow that Pr(R) ¸
c¸














































c¸ (for n SL).
Step 9. A Persistent Competitive Gap. Let ~ R ¾ R be the event that all the
players get it nearly right — the …rst n players are not bidding below J¸
3=5 and
the others are not bidding above J ¸
2=5. For i > n; de…ne R¡i to be the event
that all players except i play according to type. If R¡i occurs and player i bids





















~ pi ! 0:
Arguing symmetrically, X
i·n
~ qi ! 0:
With the ordering described in Step 2, ~ R occurs when the …rst n players
do not bid weakly down and the last n players do not bid weakly up, that is,
~ R = (\i·n ~ Dc
i) \ (\i>n ~ Uc
i ). Thus,






~ pi ! 1:
35Step 10. A Contradiction. When ~ R \ N 0 occurs, [J ¸
2=5;J ¸
3=5] is in the interior
of cg (players 1;:::;n bid strictly above J3=5; and other players strictly below
J2=5: And since the probability of trade is bounded away from 0; and since
Pr( ~ R) ! 1; there is at least one buyer in f1;:::;ng and at least one seller in
fn + 1;:::;2ng:
Let p¤ be the expected price conditional on ~ R: Either p¤ · J¸
1=2, or p¤ ¸
J ¸
1=2: Wlog, assume p¤ ¸ J ¸




Assume …rst that J ¸
1 ¸ 1 ¡ 3x¸. Consider any buyer in f1;:::;ng: A bid
of J ¸
2=5 wins whenever ~ R occurs, and forces the price to at most J ¸
2=5. So,




6 : On the other hand, when ~ R does not occur, he may go from
being a winner to a loser. But, for this to happen, it must be that cg ¸ J ¸
2=5:




¡ (1 ¡ Pr( ~ R))4x¸
is eventually positive, and we have a contradiction.
Assume J¸
1 < 1 ¡ 3x¸. Given N 0; the number of buyers with value in ¡
J ¸
1 + 2x¸;J ¸
1 + 3x¸¢










trade conditional on ~ R\N 0 (and so bid above J ¸
3=5) Consider the deviation that
any buyer with value in
¡
J ¸
1 + 2x¸;J ¸
1 + 3x¸¢
and bid above J ¸ bids J ¸
2=5 in-
stead. Given ~ R\ N 0; this gains the buyer at least x¸=6: Given N 0; the number





is at least w0nx¸ and at most W 0nx¸:
So, given R \ N 0; the expected sum of gains is at least w0nx¸
2
x¸
6 : The loss from
such a buyer going from being a winner to a loser is again at most 4x¸: Given
N 0n~ R; there are at most W 0nx¸ such buyers. In N 0c; the worst case is that all










































































The LHS goes to w0=12; while the RHS goes to 0, a contradiction. ¥
7.6 Proofs for Section 5
Let x be the random variable sgm ¡ cg: In an m unit demand/supply setting,
this is the maximum impact of raising a buyer’s bid vector on price. Let p be
the price. We will show that in expectation buyers achieve within 1
2n1¡® of the
consumer surplus if they can price take at p: A symmetric argument applies to
sellers. But, the sum of consumer and producer surplus at an arbitrary p is at
least as large as the surplus at the Walrasian price. So, this both establishes
that the market achieves within 1=n1¡® of the e¢cient surplus and that price
must be asymptotically Walrasian (else the market achieves more than the fea-
sible surplus, a contradiction). Finally, from NAG and NAA, expected feasible
surplus grows like n; and the result follows.
Consider the truth-telling deviation di(bi;vi) = vi; remembering that vi and
bi are now vectors in [0;1]m. Let W be the set of ih , i 2 NB that are allocated
an object. Let SLih = 0 if i wins an object h; and let SLih = max [vih ¡ p;0]
otherwise. So, SLih gives the loss in consumer surplus compared to taking at p
from i not winning object h:
In any given realization, think about moving from bi to vi one bid at a time,
starting from bi1: Let ^ Cih be the cost to i from raising bid h in terms of raising
the price paid on units already won, and ^ Bih the pro…t to i of winning an extra
unit.
If vih < cg; then raising bih to vih is irrelevant to both p and the allocation.
Hence, ^ Bih ¡ ^ Cih = 0: And, since vih < p; SLih = 0:
If vih 2 [cg;sg + 2mx]; then raising bih to vih may raise the price on units
already won by as much as x: So, ^ Bih ¡ ^ Cih ¸ ¡ (m ¡ 1)x. And, since vih 2
[cg;sg + 2mx] and p ¸ cg, SLih · (2m + 1)x. In any normal realization, the
number of such ih is at most Knx for some K < 1: In a non-normal realization,
there are at most nm values in this range. Hence, the expected number of such












37Consider ih 2 W such that vih > sg + 2mx. In any realization, at most
1 player who is winning an object is also in a position to a¤ect the price by
changing the associated bid. And, the impact of that bid on price is at most x:
Hence, X
fih2Wjvih>sg+2mxg




Finally, consider ih = 2 W such that vih > sg + 2mx. Then, by deviating to
bih = vih; i raises the raise the price on at most m¡1 previous units by at most
x: But, i also wins an extra object at price at most sg: So,


































































































































































A ¡ 2E(x) ¡ K00nE(x2) (for n SL)









































n1¡®1 (for n SL).
And, E(x) · 1



















































































n3 xmE(x) + K0000E(nx2)
·
1
2n1¡® for n SL
Arguing analogously for sellers, E (
P
ih SLih) · 1
2n1¡®: Hence, the expected
sum of consumer and producer surplus is within 1=n1¡® of that achieved by the
Walrasian outcome, and we are done. ¥
39